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The Case for Legal Pluralism
Arend Soeteman*
Gavin W. Anderson, Constitutional Rights After Globalization (Oxford and Port-
land, Hart Publishing 2005) 156 p., ISBN 1841134481
This is a peculiar book. According to its title, it seems to deal with the problem of
the existence and implementation of constitutional rights in an era where the
importance of national states is diminishing. The main body of the book, how-
ever, is not about constitutional rights at all, but is a criticism of, what is called by
Anderson, liberal legalism. This liberal legalism is, he argues, the dominant para-
digm in the profession, but it is seriously flawed. Happily, Anderson has an alter-
native: the doctrine of legal pluralism, which, according to him, is the principal
rival of liberal legalism (p. 44).
In the introductory chapter and in the last part of the book, constitutional
rights and legal pluralism come together: Anderson believes that the doctrine of
legal pluralism can provide us with a better understanding of the modern problem
of rights’ constitutionalism. The problem is, in his view, that political power is not
only in the hands of traditional political actors (such as kings and governments)
but also in the hands of powerful economic actors, who are supported by neoliberal
globalization and protected by traditional human rights. Those powerful eco-
nomic actors are, it seems, beyond any control.
First, let us commence with the discussion of liberal legalism and legal pluralism.
As Anderson describes it, for liberal legalism law is formal state law, which seeks to
protect individual autonomy (p. 40). The point of law, the protection of autonomy,
requires that ‘it is important to have in place a coherent set of systematically en-
forceable rules’ (p. 40, 41). Anderson recognizes three core features in liberal le-
galist epistemology: law is formal (legal norms are identified by formal criteria),
law is coherent and law is an effective means to protect individual rights (p. 42).
Legal pluralism denies all these core features: ‘law is not found solely on the pro-
cesses of the state, and is neither internally coherent nor externally instrumental’
(p. 44).
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As to the first feature, legal pluralism argues that there is a great deal of law that
is not state-made: law in the household place, in the work place, in the market
place, in the community place, in the citizen place and in the world place are
distinguished (p. 51), and this list is not supposed to be exhaustive. The law in
statutes or made by courts may be at variance with, for example, what is consid-
ered to be normative in the family: Anderson dedicates a number of pages in
explanation of this point, which is rather obvious for all lawyers, even ‘liberal
legalists’. The only question is whether all kinds of social rules can rightly be
considered ‘law’. Anderson does not discuss this question: he quite often equates
law with social norms.1  One need not be a Hartian positivist to believe that this
makes the concept of law unworkably broad. We usually restrict ‘law’ to norms,
which are somehow more organized. This does not imply that they are organized
by the state. We can have internal law of churches, or corporations, or private
associations. It is doubtful that many serious ‘liberal legalists’ deny that the inter-
nal regulations of, for example, the Roman Catholic church are internal church
law.
Anderson’s discussion of the second core feature is more worrisome. He attacks
the idea of legal coherence by assailing Dworkin’s law as integrity. Dworkin sup-
posedly argues that law is coherent, and Anderson in opposition argues that law is
incoherent. However, Anderson misunderstands him, as Dworkin never said that
law is coherent; he only said that judges should interpret law as coherent. ‘The law
may not be a seamless web’, Dworkin argues in Taking Rights Seriously (1977, p.
116), ‘but the plaintiff is entitled to ask Hercules (the fictitious judge, AS) to treat
it as if it were’ (italics added).
Anderson repeats the criticism, which was formulated by Critical Legal Schol-
ars about 20 years ago. Dworkin has answered this criticism, for example, in Law’s
Empire (1986), saying that it is easy to give incoherent interpretations of the law
but that Critical Legal Scholars should prove that coherent interpretations are
impossible. Anderson makes no attempt to follow this advice.
As did Critical Legal Scholars, but even more unambiguously, Anderson looks
to law with a sociologist’s eye. He argues ‘that adjudication is better explained in
terms of the variety of real pressures and motivations affecting judges … rather
1 He mentions this question in another context on p. 101. There he answers that legal plural-
ism is a rebellion against ‘essentialising’ definitions (p. 102). This is much too easy. There is a
serious question whether it makes sense to include all kind of social norms in law. Anderson’s
reaction does not answer this question at all but jumps to another level. There is no contradiction
between rejecting essentialising definitions (whatever may be meant with this) and rejecting the
inclusion of all social norms in law. See also p. 105, where we find a new invalid argument: there
is no a priori distinction between normative orders because normative orders cannot exist outside
the creative capacity of their subjects. Anderson means that legal norms, social norms, family
norms and so on are all dependent on the creative capacity of their subjects. But by such an argu-
ment, we also can prove that there can be no ‘a priori distinction’ between football and baseball.
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than as the Herculean search for principle’ (p. 67). Yet, Dworkin is not a sociolo-
gist explaining the work of judges. He is arguing from the internal judges’ per-
spective as to how they should solve legal problems. The ‘right answer’, therefore,
is not an answer on which all sensible judges agree. The right answer is always
contestable. Nevertheless, it is the age-old job of judges to do their best to find the
right answers in the cases upon which they have to decide.
Anderson says that ‘(t)he major problem for liberal legalism’s attempt to por-
tray adjudication in systematic terms is that judges often (and sharply) disagree
which each other’ (p. 71). Here again Anderson makes a descriptive claim to
refute a prescriptive thesis. In Law’s Empire, Dworkin says: ‘He (the Herculean
judge) tries to impose order over doctrine, not to discover order in the forces that
created it’ (p. 273). Therefore, if Anderson extensively illustrates that legal schol-
ars might disagree with Dworkin’s answers on some substantial questions (p. 68-
77), this completely misses Dworkin’s normative point.
The third and last core feature of liberal legalism was, in Anderson’s view, that
law is an effective means to protect individual rights. Here he illustrates that lib-
eral judicial decisions on, e.g., civil rights or abortion might be counterproductive
from the liberal point of view. He may be right; I simply do not know. Neverthe-
less, his evidence is not always convincing. If, e.g., he informs us that the number
of abortions in the USA did not rise (apart from the pre-existing trend) after the
Roe-Wade decision of the Supreme Court, he measures the effects of this decision
in terms of numbers of abortions. In the Netherlands, which also has a liberal
abortion regime, the number of abortions is lower still. However, there is no one
who believes that the point of liberalisation of abortion is to promote abortions.
The point is, first, that women are supposed to have the right to decide for them-
selves and, secondly, (if there should be some empirical effects) that abortion is
not done secretly anymore, under poor and even dangerous conditions. Anderson
could have a standard of success or failure if he informs us of the number of
serious consequences for women: how many out of hundred aborted women died
or became infertile for their life before and after the liberalisation?
However, this is commenting on details. The more important point is that
Anderson loads liberal legalism with a naïve instrumentalist view of law. As long
as liberal legalism is his own invention, he is free to do so. Yet, in contesting his
own invention, he is fighting windmills. Of course, laws do have effects on soci-
ety. Law is also a part of society. Therefore, law is part of the reality upon which it
is supposed to work. This creates loopholes. As the Norwegian legal sociologist
Vilhelm Aubert explained long ago, we can make a statute to protect maids in our
households. However, for a number of reasons, the effects can be absent or even
the reverse of what was intended. We all know that the effects of the law very often
are surprising. Here, though, law is not different from other fields. The US gov-
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ernment may start a war in Iraq to fight terrorism and, in doing so, actually may
promote terrorism. Nothing is more difficult to predict than the future. Real life
liberal legalists know this, too.
Having dealt with the differences between liberal legalism and legal pluralism,
Anderson claims that the last one is ‘a powerful counter to our dominant under-
standings of constitutional law’ (p. 99). Anderson develops ‘two competing poli-
tics of constitutional definition: classical liberal constitutionalism … and … “new
constitutionalism”’(p. 100). It is clear that liberal legalism is connected with the
first and legal pluralism with the second of these two politics. The difference is
not only that new constitutionalism sees the text of the constitution as the result
of a political fight, which could have been different (which, again is not denied by
real life liberal legalists). It also is that new constitutionalism considers ‘the tacit
constitution’ as an equally important source of constitutional law. Moreover, and
in particular, all the instruments of modern globalisation guarding the capitalist
liberal economic order are also important in constitutional law. This lets us see
that power not only originates in the state, but also in international organisations
and international corporations. In the traditional liberal constitutionalism, big
corporations are only subjects, using their constitutionally guaranteed freedoms
to pursue their capitalist purposes. However, in the new constitutionalism, they
are also sources of law, which have to justify their legitimacy.
Apart from some terminology, this is the most convincing part of the book.
There indeed exists a problem about the legitimacy and control of international
power. This (as Anderson agrees) not only applies to big corporations, it also
applies to international organisations, such as the United Nations and its Security
Council, to WTO and IMF, and to the EU. Unfortunately, however, Anderson
does not make true his claim that ‘a legal pluralist perspective provides us with a
richer basis for assessing constitutionalism’s counter hegemonic potential than the
normative method favoured by liberal legalism’ (p. 116).
This is partly due to the fact that he again creates his own enemy. He opposes
a rather libertarian liberalism (which defends that rights are protections accorded
by law primarily to individual economic activities) with a pluralist liberalism (which
acknowledges that if left to itself, the economic market will generate injustice and
inequality) (cf. p. 132). Yet, modern mainstream liberalism (John Rawls, Ronald
Dworkin) tries to regulate the market so that every individual has equal opportu-
nities. It tries to prevent the shortcomings of the libertarian market. Mainstream
liberalism should be considered here as an ally, not as an enemy.
Another failure is due to the fact that Anderson uses an incorrect methodology.
To prove that legal pluralism is preferable to liberal legalism, Anderson refers to a
number of legal decisions which are supposed to be inspired by liberal legalism. If
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some legal decisions are better than other ones, still the ‘deep grammar’ of judicial
thought that accompanies them is flawed (p. 140). This author is not competent
to judge how representative is the selection of decisions, but even if the picture is
completely reliable, it does not establish that liberal legalism is wrong. It is pos-
sible that a better understanding of liberal legalism could produce all the results
Anderson desires. To establish his point, Anderson should choose between two
different strategies. He either should try to prove that liberal legalism is inconsis-
tent with any serious and sensible attempt to deal with the problem of non-state
power, or he should try to prove that, even if liberal legalism were consistent and
coherent with the desired positions, it in fact would promote incorrect decisions.
Yet, Anderson does neither. The fact that legal decisions are wrong could very well
be explained by the well-known slowness of the judiciary to adapt to new circum-
stances or by the poor political-philosophical education of judges and lawyers or
by a number of other causes.
An important point of Anderson’s criticism of liberal legalism is the ‘divisions’ it
makes between public and private, state and civil society. Yet, it is not clear what
exactly is Anderson’s target. Sometimes he suggests that protection of the private
sphere itself is ill conceived (e.g., p. 140). Sometimes he argues that these ‘divi-
sions’ can have no a priori status (p. 147). If he means to say that there are border-
line cases where private and public, state and civil society come together, he is
right. If he means to say that the labels mentioned are themselves a result of
political and normative decisions, he is right again. Calling something private or
public is an evaluative act itself. When we call something public, we indicate that
we judge that it involves some collective responsibility of the political community.
Calling something private indicates an individual responsibility of an individual
person (or group/association of individual persons), but not of the state. These
labels are not given once and for all: our insights may change over time. Domestic
violence (discussed several times by Anderson) used to be private, but it is not
today. Homosexual intercourse used to be public, but is private today (at least in
liberal legalist countries). Nevertheless, liberals need this distinction, in one inter-
pretation or another. It is the central idea of liberalism that individuals have the
right, as much as possible, to be the master of their own lives. This implies that
state competences should be limited. If Anderson were to reject this idea, he would
be wrong or, at least, in opposition to liberalism.
However, if he did, what would be the alternative? The first alternative is that
there is no individual responsibility at all: the political community has to decide
on all points. This is the view of dictatorial regimes (and of respected philoso-
phers, such as Rousseau). The second alternative is that there is no collective po-
litical responsibility at all. This leads to anarchy. The third alternative is that one’s
Arend Soeteman
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theory is muddled. One would hope that none of these would apply to Anderson;
however, no fourth possibility is apparent.
In the last paragraph of his book, Anderson demands a paradigm shift: legal
pluralism should provide the new paradigm. However, new paradigms do not
arise on command. They will become attractive only if they appear to be useful in
solving problems. Clearly, Anderson still has some work to do.
